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With the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon came the possibility for 
Member States to launch an initiative under the Ordinary Legislative 
Procedure.  This  came  into  being  as  the  scope  of  co-decision  was 
expanded to cover the more sensitive issues of the third pillar (such 
as judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation).   
It was considered necessary that Member States have a shared right of 
initiative with the European Commission. One case in which the right 
of initiative was invoked was the Initiative for a European Protection 
Order (EPO). This dossier is one of the first and few cases in which the 
Member States’ Initiative after the Treaty of Lisbon was used. It resulted 
in a turf war between the Presidency and the Commission regarding 
the scope of the Member States’ Initiatives. This article looks into the 
Member States’ Initiative as it was introduced after the Treaty of Lisbon 
and the debate that took place on the EPO.
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Introduction
With  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon  several 
changes in the domain of Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) 
took place. Amongst the changes made, the shared right of 
initiative  in  the  Ordinary  Legislative  Procedure  (OLP),  as  is 
presented in Article 76 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), is one of the novelties in which the 
Commission shares with the Member States the prerogative of 
presenting legislative proposals in the field of police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters (Chapter 4 TFEU) and Policy 
Cooperation (Chapter 5 TFEU). In terms of decision-making, the 
Article presents a junction from which two separate forms of 
decision-making procedures in the field of FSJ sprout, pending 
upon the actor(s) who seize the legislative initiative. This article 
will examine the role of the institutional actors in a Member 
State’s Initiative, the policy scope on which it applies, as well as 
reflecting on some of the future developments. The article will 
use the case of the initiative on the European Protection Order 
(EPO) to analyse some of the more practical implications of a 
shared initiative as it sparked an institutional debate on the 
limitation of a Member State’s Initiative. 
Sharing the Initiative
When the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the pillars of 
the EU were abandoned except for some of the special rules 
and procedures that remain in place for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP). For FSJ, this meant that co-decision 
would be further extended into this domain and that the EU 
would  now  use  the  same  legal  instruments  and  decision-
making procedures as the community had been using over 
the years. Yet, there is a notable exception to this general rule. 
Decision-making  regarding  cooperation  in  criminal  matters 
and police cooperation does not always follow the standard 
OLP procedure as outlined in the TFEU: instead, it is governed 
by  two  different  procedures.  The  starting  point  of  either 
procedure can be found in Article 76 TFEU which specifies that 
the right of initiative is to be shared between the Commission 
and the Member States. The first procedure stated in Article 
76  TFEU  is  the  OLP  which  starts  on  a  proposal  from  the 
Commission. The second procedure deals with the Member 
States’ Initiative and requires a quarter of the Member States 
to support the initiative: this means that the support of seven 
Member States is needed in order to launch the initiative. 
Article  294  TFEU,  which  outlines  the 
decision-making procedure, includes some 
special provisions to cover the matter of the 
Member States’ Initiative in paragraph 15. 
Consequently, it can be stated that there 
are two decision-making procedures that 
govern the cooperation in criminal matters 
and police cooperation. If the Commission presents a proposal 
under Article 76a TFEU, the OLP will apply. Yet, if the Member 
States present an initiative under Article 76b TFEU, the OLP with 
the special provisions outlined in Article 294(15) TFEU will apply. 
Under the later procedure (the Member State’s initiative), the 
role of the Commission is weakened considerably. Firstly, if the 
Member States launch an initiative under Article 76b TFEU, 
the  Commission  is  no  longer  the  engine  of  the  European 
integration process. Instead, a quarter of the Member States 
develop  a  proposal.  As  it  is  no  longer  the  proposal  of  the 
Commission, the Commission will also no longer be able to 
withdraw it. Additionally, Article 294(15) TFEU further restricts 
the Commission. In the first indent it is stated that the opinion 
given by the Commission at the end of the second reading is 
no longer part of the OLP. According to the normal OLP, should 
the Commission issue a negative opinion on the amendments, 
the Council has to adopt its decision by unanimity instead of 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). By removing this requirement 
the  Council  will  always  make  decisions  using  QMV  when 
dealing with Member States’ Initiatives. Possibly, this was done 
to ensure that the Commission would not categorically give 
negative opinions on Member States’ Initiatives, thus making 
it virtually impossible to arrive at an agreement on the basis 
of  a  Member  States’  Initiative  on  such  sensitive  matters  as 
criminal matters and police. According to the second indent 
of Article 294(15) TFEU, the only role of the Commission in the 
whole process is restricted to giving advice should the Council 
or European Parliament ask for it or should the Commission 
want to present it at its own initiative. Thus, any policy initiated 
under  Article  76b TFEU  will  significantly  reduce  the  formal 
legislative powers of the Commission. 
Scope
Secondly, there is the question of interpretation of Article 76b 
TFEU in relation to issues other than cooperation in criminal 
matters and policy cooperation. Policy issues do not always 
restrict themselves to one specific issue, but instead they tend 
to have overlaps with other domains. Each of these policy 
elements might be adopted on a different legal basis which 
might  require  a  different  decision-making  procedure  to  be 
followed. 
The  EU  has,  since  the  Treaty  of  Maastricht  and  until  the 
Treaty of Lisbon, separated the different pillars with each of 
their different decision-making procedures. Naturally, policy 
overlaps occur between these pillars. This raises the question 
of which policy pillar and which decision-making procedure 
should  be  used  in  case  of  such  overlaps. The  EU  resolved 
this  through  the  so-called  ‘double-text  mechanism’.  If  the 
EU would consider it necessary that an EC policy proposal 
requires measures against criminal activities, a parallel third 
pillar proposal would be made. This mechanism would allow 
the Member States to guard their sovereign right on these 
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The  main  question,  therefore,  is  how 
Article 76b TFEU should be read when 
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topics. Yet, problems emerged as soon as ‘criminal-regulatory’ 
policy issues were addressed. Here, both the Commission and 
the Council claim competence, resulting in a clash between 
the two1.  
The clash came when the Council adopted the Framework 
Decision 2003/80/JHA on the protection of the environment 
through criminal law. The Commission presented a proposal 
on  the  criminalising  of  environmental  offences  through   
Article  175(1)  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European   
Community (TEC). The Council felt that the Commission went 
beyond  its  competence  which  resulted  in  a  Member  State   
Initiative2  from  Denmark.  The  Commission,  on  the  other 
hand,  did  not  agree  with  the  approach  of  the  Council.   
It believed that the Council was using third pillar instruments 
to deal with first pillar policy issues. The issue came before 
the ECJ who ruled in favour of the Commission, stating that 
the  Council  has  violated 
ex  Article  47  TEU  as  the 
Framework  Decision  as 
it‘...  encroaches  on  the 
powers  which  Article 
175  TEC  confers  on  the 
Community’3.  Even  with
regard  to  other  TEC   
articles,  the  ECJ  believed 
that such an encroachment 
should be prevented. 
With the protection of ex Article 47 TEU, the Commission 
could  combine  Community  legislation  with  legislation  on 
cooperation in criminal matters, but the Member States could 
not establish Union legislation and apply it to the Community. 
Thus, the Community pillar is protected from any interference 
of the third pillar through Article 47 TEU. This provides for the 
safeguarding under TEU and it prevents the decision-making 
procedures of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar from 
being dealt with by Community Policy.
Yet,  with  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon,  the  JHA  pillar  structure 
disappeared. Article 40 TEU is the new article of the Treaty of 
Lisbon which has replaced the ex Article 47 TEU. The wording 
has  been  changed  drastically  as  has  its  focus.  Before  the 
Treaty of Lisbon, ex Article 47 TEU covered second and third 
pillar issues in relation to first pillar legislation. The new article 
refers only to provisions dealing with CFSP. For the decision-
making procedure regarding cooperation in criminal matters 
and police cooperation, the main question, therefore, is how 
Article  76b TFEU  should  be  read  when  overlaps  occur.  Are 
Member States allowed to present initiatives if the topic is also 
related to matters on which the European Commission has the 
exclusive right of initiative? If so, the role of the Commission 
in  the  decision-making  procedure  dealing  with  Member 
States’ Initiatives is much weaker than when the Commission 
presents a proposal. A broad interpretation of legislation in 
Chapter 4 TFEU and Chapter 5 TFEU would make it possible 
for the Member States to block the Commission from playing 
an effective role in the decision-making process. It would also 
mean  the  penalisation  of  EU  policy  as  the  Member  States, 
probably under the leadership of the Council Presidencies, will 
be more eager to propose initiatives on matters outside the 
scope of the Member States’ Initiative, but add a component 
dealing with criminal matters or police cooperation to give it 
the appropriate legal basis. 
European Protection Order
Political drive of the Presidency
This  eagerness  of  Member  States  to  use  the  provision  of 
Article  76b  TFEU  became  obvious  when,  just  two  months 
after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the initiative 
of  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Estonia,  Spain,  France,  Italy,  Hungary, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Finland and Sweden to establish 
a European Protection Order (EPO) was launched. Victims of a 
crime (e.g. sexual assault, harassment, domestic violence) can 
receive protection from a state by means of a protection order 
(e.g. a restraining order). Yet, an order issued in one EU Member 
State might not be recognised by another EU Member State. 
Consequently, the victim’s right of free movement through the 
EU is restricted to the territory which recognises the protection 
order. It is the purpose of the initiative to rectify this situation.
In particular, Spain was very eager to move ahead with this 
subject.  Under  the  Franco  regime,  domestic  violence  was 
not  considered  a  criminal  offence.  Awareness  grew  in  the 
decades after Franco as more field studies and institutions 
were created. A milestone was reached when the Parliament 
unanimously approved the Act for Comprehensive Protection 
against Gender Violence and it has been a policy priority ever 
since. Considering this background, Spain wanted to combat 
domestic violence on a European scale and used its term in 
Presidency for this. According to its Presidency programme:




	 the	 victims,	 will	 be	 two	 essential	 initiatives	 that	 will	 be		
	 advanced	 by	 the	 Spanish	 Presidency	 to	 achieve	 concrete		
	 progress	on	this	matter.’4
Consequently, the European Protection Order became one of 
the policy flagships of the Spanish Presidency and Spain aims 
to have it adopted in June 2010 at the end of its term. 
The decision-making process
Spain  started  the  implementation  of  its  programme  by 
sending  a  questionnaire5  to  the  various  delegations  on 
23 September 2009, which appears to serve as an alternative 
to  an  impact  assessment  of  the  Commission.  The  Spanish 
Presidency  presented  the  Member  States´  Initiative6  at  the 
Council  meeting  on  22  January  2010.  Overall  there  was 
general political support in the Council for the ideas of the 
Spanish Presidency. Yet, several questions still remained to be 
answered. 
It was the Commission who pointed out in the first Council 
meeting  on  the  EPO  that  the  legal  base  Article  82  TFEU 
does not cover civil matters which are covered by Article 81 
TFEU.  From  the  questionnaire  sent  out  by  the  Presidency, 
it  appeared  that  not  all  Member  States  had  adopted  their 
protective measures through criminal law. In most Member 
States, civil courts can also issue protective measures. Only in 
a few countries are protective measures restricted to criminal 
law. Nevertheless, covering both criminal and civil matters will 
bring forth various difficulties, amongst them an incomplete 
legal basis of only Article 82 TFEU. The Commission presented 
some possible alternatives. Firstly, the initiative would restrict 
itself to criminal matters and would later be combined with 
other  legislative  measures.  Secondly,  the  Commission  had 
The Member States’ Initiatives: An Inter-Institutional Turf War after the Treaty of Lisbon22
already started working on a legislative package which will 
be presented at the beginning of 2011 under the Hungarian 
Presidency.  The  package  will  be  based  on  an  impact 
assessment and public consultations. However, to maintain 
the momentum, the Commission suggested giving a strong 
formulation  in  the  Council  Conclusions  on  this  matter. Yet, 
though it would send a strong political signal, it would not 
be binding. At the end of the meeting the Presidency agreed 
with other delegates that binding measures were needed and 
discarded the idea of the non-binding conclusions.
During the second meeting of the JHA Council on the initiative, 
it became clear that the Council was divided. The first group 
agreed with the opinion of the legal service of the Council 
that Article 82 TFEU is sufficient as a legal base and that this 
could be applied before both civil and criminal courts. The 
second group, on the other hand, agreed with the opinion of 
the Commission which stated that the text had to be limited 
to criminal matters and that civil matters should be excluded. 
During this meeting, the Commission once again reiterated 
its views that the Article 82 TFEU needed to be limited to 
criminal matters. As guardian of the treaty, the Commission 
also  announced  that  it  would  bring  the  matter  before  the 
ECJ  should  the  adopted  directive  also  cover  civil  matters. 
The sharpening of the tone of the Commission, including the 
threat of going before the ECJ, shows the increasing friction 
between  the  Commission  and  the  Spanish  Presidency  and 
would set the stage for the time to come.
This friction came to a boiling point at the last JHA Council 
meeting under the Spanish Presidency. It became clear that 
neither side was willing to budge. In the period leading up 
to  the  Council  meeting  the  legal  service  of  the  European 
Parliament  gave  an  oral  presentation  on  the  scope  of  the 
EPO.  The  Commission  responded  very  sensitively  during 
the Council meeting to findings of the legal service on the 
Parliament. The EP legal service stated that Article 82 TFEU 
in itself was not sufficient but should be read in combination 
with  Article  3 TEU. The  Commission  believes  that  such  an 
interpretation will make it possible to create criminal law using 
Article 82 TFEU regarding all domains of Article 3 TEU (e.g. 
internal market). This would thus also mean that Article 76b 
TFEU can be used to make legislation covering the matters of 
Article 3 TEU and thus vastly extending the rights of initiative 
for the Member States. The Presidency, on the other hand, 
believes that the Commission’s opinion is a minority and wants 
to push for an agreement to move ahead in the talks with the 
European Parliament. 
In the end, the issue was not put to a vote. The Presidency 
stated that this was not the right stage to make such a decision. 
Instead, a formal decision would take place under the Belgian 
Presidency. Commissioner Reding gave her views at the end 
of the Council meeting on the whole procedure so far and 
considered it ‘a mess’7. The Presidency on the other hand, in 
its final statement claimed to have not received ’the sincere 
cooperation  of  the  Commission’8  and  voiced  its  frustration 
about the reluctance of the Commission to change its views 
on the interpretation of Article 82 TFEU. Consequently, the 
final meeting of JHA Council under the Spanish Presidency 
ended with the Commission and the Presidency falling out 
with each other during a public meeting.
After  the  Spanish  Presidency,  the  file  entered  into  calmer 
waters. The council reconfigured the initiative to only cover 
criminal  matters.  In  the  final  adopted 
version of the European Protection order, 
recital 10 states that ‘This Directive applies 
to  protection  measures  adopted  in 
criminal matters, and does not therefore 
cover  protection  measures  adopted  in 
civil matters’9. With these modifications 
a position of the Council at first reading 
was adopted on 24 November 2011 and 
sent to the European Parliament. With no 
amendments of the European Parliament 
to  the  Council’s  position  on  the  EPO 
initiative and the Commission proposal 
on civil matters on the table, the initiative was adopted as an 
early second reading agreement on 13 December 201110. With 
this, the Commission was successful in its turf war against the 
Council. 
Conclusions
From  the  EPO  case,  several  conclusions  can  be  drawn 
regarding the role of the actors and the scope of the decision-
making process. Firstly, the Presidency plays a pivotal role. The 
Member States’ Initiative is driven by the political desire of 
the Presidency. It also shows that the innovation of the Treaty 
of Lisbon to make sure that the Member States’ Initiative is 
supported by a quarter of the Member States appears to be 
lowered as the submission of an initiative will most likely need 
the support of the whole trio. This support is needed not only 
to ensure a good cooperation between the Trio Presidency 
but  also  because  an  Initiative  might  last  longer  than  one 
Presidency period. As a result, it can be seen that to initiate the 
right of initiative for the Member States the formula is rather 
the Trio Presidency plus four other Member States. So it is 
appears that the threshold is low enough to make the Member 
States’ Initiative a feasible instrument. 
Having said that, the role of the Commission – which no longer 
is the engine – is by no means weak. Even though it virtually 
no longer plays a formal role in the decision-making process, 
it has many friends sitting around the table. In the EPO case, it 
was possible for the Commission to gather a blocking minority 
for the EPO proposal. When the Spanish Presidency tried to 
gain a majority by opting out the UK (the UK opted in but was 
not in favour of the proposed form of the proposal), other 
Member States which initially supported the Spanish proposal 
started to back down in their support. The support for the 
Presidency is therefore by no means fixed and the Commission 
can  through  informal  channels  always  influence  positions.   
As a final measure the Commission can at all times approach 
the ECJ as guardian of the Treaties. 
Finally, with the EPO, the battle appears to be won in favour 
of the Commission. With the Council limiting the initiative to 
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just criminal matters, the Commission successfully defended 
its ground. However, the main question on ex Article 47 TEU 
remains unanswered as it is still unclear as regards to what 
extent the Member States can use the initiative to wander into 
the domains of OLP. Most likely a future court case will have to 
provide clarity.
Nevertheless, considering the inter-institutional debate and 
outcome  of  the  EPO  case,  it  is  not  likely  that  many  more 
controversial  Member  States’  Initiatives  will  be  presented 
soon. For a Presidency to push a policy initiative, it requires 
a significant political impulse and the political costs of failure 
are high. Instead it is easier and politically safer to contact 
the Commission directly and ask them for a proposal. In most 
cases, the Commission will act upon these requests. Yet, as 
long as the instrument is available in the treaty, it will remain 
a  usable  option  and  at  some  point  new  inter-institutional 
conflicts are bound to occur as the dust has still not settled 
around the edges of FSJ.  
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